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  Stefán Snaevarr
Abstract
The theme of this paper is the idea that imaginative literature
can disclose our tacit knowledge of emotions. It this does with
the aid of such devices as metaphors and similes. The kind of
insight we get thanks to the disclosive power of literature is
akin to that which Kjell S. Johannessen has called 'knowledge
by familiarity,' Frank Palmer 'knowing what' and Charles Taylor
implicitly 'the result of articulation.' I defend the theory that at
least some important emotions cannot be understood (or even
exist) outside of behavioral contexts and that this
understanding is mainly tacit. I try to show that certain works
of literature can disclose this kind of tacit knowledge, not least
because of the productive distance to this knowledge
imaginative literature gives. Further, I use several examples
from imaginative literature to show how poetical metaphors,
poetical similes, the Verfremdung and other poetical devices
disclose tacit knowledge of emotions.
Key Words
articulation, disclosure, emotions, Johannessen, Lakoff,
literature, maieutics, metaphors, Palmer, tacit knowledge,
Taylor
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1. Introduction.
In this paper I want to show that poetics need maieutics. The
reason is that imaginative literature can disclose the tacit
sides of our knowledge about emotions.[1] Literature helps us
bear forth the knowledge we are pregnant with; it is our
spiritual midwife like Socrates of old, hence the title of this
paper. Thus literature does not necessarily increase our
knowledge but rather helps us articulate our tacit knowledge, a
knowledge we already possess (there is a sense in which that
kind of knowledge possesses us!). I think that this theory
explicates the widespread intuition that literature tends to deal
with some kind of intuitive knowledge, knowledge that cannot
be adequately expressed in non-literary, prosaic ways. Among
those who have had this intuition was the Norwegian poet
Johann Sebastian Welhaven, who said that poetry expresses
the ineffable.[2]
Let me briefly outline the themes of this paper. First, I will
discuss the concept of tacit knowledge. The second theme is
the question of whether our knowledge of emotions tends to
have tacit sides, a question that is answered in the affirmative.
The discussion about the second theme is woven into an
attempt to show how imaginative literature can make us
aware of our tacit knowledge of emotions. This attempt is my
third and most important theme.
2. A Wittgensteinian Brand of Tacit Knowledge
As is well known, tacit knowledge is a kind of knowledge that
we cannot adequately express in propositions. This is a sort of
implicit or intuitive knowledge. Among the paradigmatic

examples of such knowledge are our diverse types of knowhow. A biker and a swimmer have know-how, which enables
them to cycle and swim without necessarily being able to
explain their know-how with the aid of propositions. And we
certainly cannot learn to swim or cycle by acquiring
propositional knowledge; we acquire the skills in question
primarily by trial and error. Actually, if we try to cycle or swim
consciously and in the process apply propositional knowledge
to the task at hand, we risk losing our control, fall off the bike,
or drown.[3]
Our knowledge of the way people walk is basically tacit. I can
know a certain person's way of walking with somnambulistic
certainty, but I cannot express this knowledge in propositions
in such a way that my hearers or readers can individuate his
walking without having seen him or her walk. The same
applies to our knowledge of faces, as Michael Polanyi indeed
emphasises. He was inspired by Gestalt psychology in his
analysis of tacit knowledge. The Gestalt theorists maintained
that we could recognise a physiognomy (in our case a face) as
a whole without being able to identify its parts. Polanyi then
famously said 'we know more than we can tell.'[4]
However, Polanyi is a lesser source of inspiration to me than
Wittgenstein and his followers. Wittgenstein never used the
expression 'tacit knowledge,' but there is no doubt that it was
on the tip of his tongue:
§78. Compare knowing and saying:
how many feet high Mont Blanc ishow the word 'game' is usedhow a clarinet soundsIf you are surprised that one can know something
and not be able to say it, you are perhaps
thinking of a case like the first. Certainly not of
one like the third.[5]
These remarks have been a tremendous inspiration for the
Norwegian Wittgensteinian, Kjell S. Johannessen. He thinks
that besides know-how there is a brand of tacit knowledge
that he calls "knowledge by familiarity" (I will refer to this by
the abbreviation "KF" for the remainder of this paper). The
knowledge of the way a clarinet sounds can be an example of
such knowledge. Johannessen maintains that KF is
"intransitive," i.e., it is a type of knowledge that cannot be
entirely transferred to other means of expression. The
knowledge in question is closely connected to experiences of
certain kinds, for instance of music or of Gestalten.[6] It is
obvious that knowing how a clarinet sounds is not know-how,
in contrast to the ability to play the instrument. Knowing the
sound of a clarinet is possessing tacit knowledge about a
phenomenon. We show by our actions that we possess knowhow, but the same does not apply to our possession of KF. In
some ways the KF is closer to propositional knowledge than to
know-how. Just like propositional knowledge, KF is know-that,
not the ability to perform certain tasks. Secondly, this kind of
knowledge is autotelic, i.e., has its aim in itself, and cannot be
used for anything except to be related to by the knower in

experience and reflection. Thirdly, KF can only be acquired by
personal acquisition and must be personal knowledge.[7]
I think that Johannessen is on the right track.[8] It seems to
me that our knowledge about faces and ways of walking is KF.
It is tacit knowledge, it is knowledge about something, and it
is definitely not know-how. At the same it almost goes without
saying that this kind of knowledge is pretty practical.
Be that as it may, Johannessen says somewhat surprisingly
that linguistic devices, such as metaphors and analogies, play
a certain role in hinting at our KF. Actually, Johannessen does
not use the expression "hinting at KF," but I think it is fairly
obvious that it does not make sense to say we can explicate
tacit knowledge in a satisfactory manner, only hint at it.
Interestingly enough, Wittgenstein himself says that in
describing a musical passage, we only hint at it.[9] When I
talk about the articulation of KF, I mean, by 'articulation,'
something in the direction of hinting at KF, making a sketch of
KF or disclosing KF. The tools for the articulation are
metaphors, analogies, similes, literary devices, meaningful
gestures, and the like.
Now, saying that language plays a role in the articulation
surely sounds like a contradiction in terms. Admittedly,
Johannessen is bit unclear on this issue. It is not clear whether
he thinks that the linguistic devices must play a role in the
articulation of all forms of KF, or whether their use is optional,
or whether there are forms of KF where language has no role
to play whatsoever. I think it suffices to say that there are
cases of KF where language plays an important, perhaps
necessary, part in the articulation and that there might be
cases where language has no role to play. My hunch is that
language plays an important role in the articulation of our
knowledge of faces, ways of walking and, as we later will see,
in our tacit knowledge of emotions (this list is hardly
exhaustive).
Let us look at our knowledge of faces. It does not make sense
to say that person P knows John's way of walking or his face
unless there is a way of putting forth assertions like "P knows
John's way of walking" or "I, P, know that this, here, is John's
face." Only with the aid of such linguistic means as assertions
can we discern between knowledge about faces/ways of
walking and pure reactions to them. That Fido barks happily
whenever he sees John does not mean that he knows that this
is John's face (mutatis mutandis the same holds for the dog's
reaction to John's way of walking). Seeing the face (or the
person walking) triggers some reaction in Fido, but he hardly
possesses the concepts of a face and a person. Therefore, he
cannot be said to subsume what he reacts to under the
concept of a face. Thus, he does not really know John's face,
and even if he does possess such knowledge, it would not be a
paradigmatic knowledge of a face. Paradigmatic knowledge of
faces and similar things would be knowledge possessed by a
minded being endowed with linguistic competence and mastery
of concepts (that the knowledge, which this being possesses,
has pre-conceptual foundation is altogether another matter).
One of the reasons for this is that the concept of knowledge
was created to account for the knowledge that such a being
possesses. The burden of proof is upon anybody who thinks

that non-minded beings possess conceptual knowledge, at
least of the abstract kind.
The upshot of this is that some kind of language, a symbolic
system that provides the means for the creation of assertions,
plays an essential role for the constitution and understanding
of at least certain kinds of KF.[10] This fact points in the
direction of language having a role to play in the articulation of
this type of KF. However, assertions that are literally meant
and/or understood play an essential role in informing us about
the fact that John has a face and thus determine it as a
certain object of which one can have KF of. In contrast, these
kinds of assertions are not of any great help when it comes to
give information about how his face is, which is the proper
domain of KF. Assertions of this type are not very successful in
describing John's face or for that matter his manner of
walking. Try to make people recognise a face they have never
seen on the basis of descriptions alone and you are almost
certainly bound to fail (that is, unless the face has some
strange individual mark like a huge wart). Try to make people
visualise correctly such an unknown face solely on the basis of
descriptions and your attempt is doomed. Such descriptions
alone cannot help us to identify John's face/way of walking,
even though they can be a part of the articulation of our KF of
the face/way of walking. I can probably describe types of
faces and manners of walking with the aid of literal assertions,
but I can hardly individuate a face/way of walking in that
fashion.
Here, meaningful gestures can come in handy; pointing at
John can do wonders in identifying him. Similes and metaphors
improve the situation. For instance I can say, "He walks like
an old cow" and thus use a simile.[11] And when describing
his face I can say metaphorically, "He has a beaver's face."
There are cases where such metaphors and similes are apt
and cases where they are not. It would usually not be apt to
call a toothless person's face "a beaver's face"; a round face
with two very prominent front teeth would be a hot candidate
for the "beaver face" title. So we can at least make sketches of
our tacit knowledge of faces with the aid of such metaphors.
What metaphoric sketches would I need to make in order to
articulate my propositional knowledge that 2 + 2= 4?
Assertions like "two and two equals four" do the job nicely.
And if I describe my pencil as being literally white and seven
centimetres long, what is left out in this literal description,
which would require hinting with the aid of metaphors and
meaningful gestures? The answer to both questions is
"Nothing." So there are cases where the articulation of KF
requires figurative language; propositional knowledge usually
does not meet such a need.
There is one aspect of the articulation of KF I have not
mentioned. As the good Wittgensteinian he is, Johannessen
stresses the role of examples in such an articulation. To give
yet another example of my own making, I cannot explain what
baroque music is solely in words, even though I instantly hear
that certain musical pieces belong to that genre. But I can
give examples of baroque music – some pieces of Italian
baroque on the one hand, and some pieces of German
baroque on the other. Additionally, it would be advisable to
give examples of borderline cases, and even examples of

rococo and renaissance music as an instructive contrast. Later
we will discover the importance of concrete examples for the
KF of emotions.
3. Palmer's Know-What and Taylor's Articulation
KF has a cousin called "know-what," a brain child of the
English philosopher and Wittgensteinian Frank Palmer. "Knowwhat" is a third type of tacit knowledge, alongside know-how
and KF. According to Palmer, our knowledge of emotions is
what he terms "knowing what," which differs from "knowing
that." We can know that sadness is caused by too little
serotonin in the brain but at the same time have no inkling
about what it feels like to be sad. In order to know that, we
must, of course, experience sadness. Such knowledge is not
necessarily propositional, for it does not involve the ability to
provide descriptions. Rather, it involves the capability to recall
or even imagine experience. Propositional knowledge has the
form "know that p," and the object of knowledge is a true
proposition. But if we have "know-what" about a phenomenon,
then the object of knowledge is an experience, not a
proposition.
Interestingly enough, it does not really make sense to equate
the mere experience of depression with knowing what the
experience is like. It seems absurd to maintain that there is an
equivalence between "I am depressed" and "I am knowing
depression." However, there is no such absurdity involved in
equating "I have experienced depression" and "I have known
depression." The fact that the past-tense statements are
equivalent suggests that this type of knowledge requires a
certain distance. If I understand Palmer correctly, this is the
reason why literary works can express "know-what"; whatever
the nature of such a literary expression is, it is not the same
as the subjective experience of emotions. A book has no
feelings and can therefore provide us with a distance to our
own emotions. I think this is quite correct; as we will see later,
this distance is productive in the sense of producing insights.
Palmer says that Shakespeare would not have been able to
write Hamlet, nor could readers understand the play, if there
was no way of getting into the mind of a depressed person
and seeing the world through his or her eyes. In actual fact,
even though "know-what" is non-propositional, it is not
entirely ineffable; witness Johannessen's analysis. The ability
to say it, amounts to showing, and showing requires talent
and imagination. He contrasts showing with telling, the latter
being a simple description of states of affairs like "I am not
feeling very well, my wife has left me." Poems that are worth
their salt do not just contain the poet's descriptions of his or
her state of mind but rather show it with the aid of images,
metaphors, and such literary devices as rhythm (he seems to
be using 'showing' in the sense of 'disclosing,' a fruitful use
indeed). In order to show what love or sadness is, we need
something akin to the condition of poetry.[12] Imaginative
literature helps us to imagine what it means to experience
such emotions, and thus know what they are, Palmer
says.[13]
It does not require great imagination to see that Palmer's
"know-what" is a kind of tacit knowledge, a third kind
alongside know-how and KF. It is closely related to KF, but

perhaps somewhat closer to propositional knowledge than KF.
The reason is that "know-what" consists in the classification of
phenomena ("This is depression"), just as propositional
knowledge often is ("This is a table"). In contrast, KF does not
give us classificatory knowledge. But the nature of the "knowwhat" classifications is obviously different from that of the
propositional ones. Propositional knowledge is in many cases
knowledge of that which is somehow tangible or objective, for
instance, tables. (It can also be knowledge of that which is
objective, but not tangible, for instance, mathematical
theorems). In contrast to this, "know-what" can only be
knowledge of the subjective. Further, it goes almost without
saying that we know propositional and "know-what"
classifications in a different fashion. Be that as it may, I think
that Palmer's contentions are by and large correct and that
they are in harmony with those of Johannessen, whose
contentions which I have mainly endorsed.
As I have already hinted, Johannessen does not explicate the
concept of articulation. Perhaps we can get some help from
Charles Taylor, not because he necessarily uses the term in
the same sense as the Norwegian philosopher, but because his
concept of articulation is fruitful for my undertaking. What,
precisely, is an articulation in Taylor's scheme of things? We
can start by stating what it is not. It is not the finding of a
technical term for a feature of some engine or plant, which
one can easily identify with an adequate description: "the long
metal part sticking out on the left." Although Taylor, to my
knowledge, nowhere says so explicitly, articulation is not
explication of the meaning of terms with the aid of logical
analysis. When I articulate something, I am seeking a
language to identify how I feel or to make clear how a thing
looks or what was peculiar about a certain person's behaviour.
A linguistic articulation can make us explicitly aware of
phenomena we previously had only an implicit sense of. Taylor
talks like articulation is a process that leads to formulation. By
formulating some matter, we bring it to a fuller and clearer
consciousness, we identify the matter in question, and thereby
grasp its contours. An articulated view is a view where certain
distinctions are being made. These distinctions give the
phenomenon articulated certain contours; to focus on it in an
articulated fashion is to find an adequate description of it. At
the same time, an articulation does not describe things
independent of itself (the articulation) in the manner of a
description like "This table is brown." An articulation alters the
object at hand in a certain way. It shapes and reshapes its
object; in some sense it constitutes it, but at the same time
must be true to it. In the case of a genuine articulation, we
can only by hindsight know what it was we tried to identify.
What we had an implicit sense of only becomes clear after we
have articulated it clearly and can look back on our attempts
at articulation.[14]
Let us look again at the role articulation plays in our emotional
life, according to Taylor. Articulations are like interpretations in
that they are attempts to clarify the import things have for us.
Further, emotions, at least those that touch essential human
concerns, are partly shaped by the way we articulate them.
The descriptions of these emotions that we tend to offer are
not simply external to the reality described, leaving it
unchanged, but rather constitutive of it. Thus when we

articulate an emotion in a new fashion, often the emotion also
changes. Let us say that I am confused over my feelings for a
woman. Due to articulation, I come to see this feeling as
fascination and not the sort of love on which a relationship can
be built. The emotions themselves have become clearer, less
fluctuating, have steadier boundaries. Think about a person
who has felt very guilty about a certain practice and who has
later come to maintain that there is nothing wrong with it. The
quality of the feeling of guilt changes; it may disappear
completely. If the feeling does not disappear, it has changed
because the person now understands it as a kind of residual
reflex from his or her upbringing. The person in question no
longer accords the feeling the same status, that of reflecting
an unfortunate moral truth about him or herself.[15]
It is hard to understand exactly what Taylor means when he
says that articulation both constitutes changes and is true to
the object. But it might become clearer in the light of Max
Black's contention that metaphors constitute and reshape
objects and, in the process, deepen our understanding of
them. Black maintains that metaphors constitute and reshape
objects and at the same time can give us insights into these
objects. Let us imagine that we describe a battle with the aid
of metaphors that originate in the vocabulary of chess. This
would lead us to stress certain aspects of the battle while
downplaying others. The chess-related metaphors filter and
transform that which is being described; for instance, they
filter out the emotional aspect of the battle.[16] This is quite
correct; metaphoric transformations can give us insights.
These transformations are at least partly of the same kind as
reshaping due to articulation, and therefore it is plausible that
articulation can provide us with insights. Furthermore, Taylor's
concept of articulation can be fruitful for my project not least
because he sees articulation as being a means for making
implicit (tacit?) knowledge explicit. I think that poetical
metaphors, similes, and other literary devices may help us
articulate our emotions and, at the same time, shape,
reshape, and partly constitute them. So, presumably, these
devices can reshape our knowledge of familiarity, while
articulating it. I will later give a concrete example of this in
connection with my analysis of some well-known
Shakespearean metaphors and similes, as well as of a poem
by August Stramm.
Notice that "the Taylorian articulation" is an articulation of a
person's own feelings. We will see that "the Johannessenian
articulation" is an articulation of our knowledge by familiarity
of emotions, regardless whether they are our own or others.
Moreover, whatever cognitive insights Taylorian articulation
can lead to, it cannot be "know-what" of emotions, since
"know-what" has to do with the nature of a given emotion
(the "whatness" of, say, wrath). However, I think that "knowwhat" and Taylorian articulation are mutually dependent. In
order to acquire "know-what" of emotion E, we must be able
to experience it, and that experience would be impoverished if
it were not an articulated experience. Articulation can help us
to understand what given emotions really are. I, for instance,
get a clearer understanding of the nature of true love versus
fascination thanks to my articulation of my feelings towards
the woman I mentioned. And in order for us to be able to
articulate in a Taylorian fashion, we must have "know-what" of

at least some emotions. (Obviously, we cannot articulate a
feeling as being the feeling of depression unless we know the
"whatness" of depression or some related emotions).
In the next section, we will see why knowledge by familiarity is
essential for our emotional knowledge. In that context we will
see how Taylorian articulation and "know-what" can be
brought in harmony with the idea of knowledge by familiarity.
We will also see that the devices embedded in literary works
can be useful when we acquire "know-what," articulate our
own emotions, and articulate our KF of the emotional world.
We have discovered that there are at least three types of tacit
knowledge: know-how, knowledge by familiarity and "knowwhat." We can acquire "know-what" thanks to the disclosive
or showing function of literature. Further, we can articulate
knowledge by familiarity with the aid of literary devices; at the
same time, (Taylorian) articulation is an important tool for the
understanding of emotions.
4. Some Remarks on Imaginative Literature
I want to add some comments on imaginative literature, its
nature, and its disclosive capacities. It goes almost without
saying that metaphors, similes, and even concrete, nonabstract examples tend to play a greater role in imaginative
literature, especially poetry, than in other types of discourse,
written or verbal. As is well known, they are among the most
important devices of imaginative literature. Therefore, I will
hereafter refer to metaphors, similes, stylistic devices
(including the use of rhythm), and concrete examples, etc., as
"the devices." My aim in this paper is to show how these
devices as used in literary works can make us aware of tacit
sides of our knowledge about emotions.
Works of imaginative literature are works where the devices
dominate and are indicators of literariness; the more clout
they wield in a text, the better reasons we have to call it a
work of imaginative literature.[17] But the concept of
imaginative literature has blurred edges: Are, for instance, the
Icelandic sagas works of fact or fiction? Further, there is a thin
line between imaginative literature, on the one hand, and
religious and philosophical texts of the poetical kind, on the
other. An example of that kind of religious text is The Gospel
According to Saint John; Nietzsche's Zarathustra will do as an
example of poetical/philosophical work. Further, there are
poetic modes of expressing oneself in daily life or in political
speeches, even in scientific discourses. That the borders of
imaginative literature are porous can be seen from the fact
that the devices are used outside of these borders. But we
have discovered that imaginative literature can give us a
unique productive distance to things. Actually, some of the
devices strengthen this distancing function of imaginative
literature, most notably the device of Verfremdung
(estrangement), which is supposed to create
Verfremdungseffekt, i.e., the effect of estrangement (an
excellent device for disclosure, indeed). To use one of Victor
Shklovsky's examples, Tolstoy estranges our workaday world
and our particular society by describing it in a short story
through the eyes of a horse, thereby making the readers
aware of things they previously took for granted.[18]
Estrangement creates a distance to the subject of the work of

literature.
Creative poetical metaphors also augment the distancing
effect; they actually often have an effect of estrangement.
Take, for instance, Shakespeare's creative poetical metaphors
in Macbeth's famous monologue, "Life's but a walking shadow,
a poor player, that struts and frets his hour upon the stage
and then is heard no more; it is a tale told by an idiot, full of
sound and fury, signifying nothing."[19] These word estrange
life, disclose it anew, make us look at it with new eyes thanks
to the distance to it that we get. (That the distance is
productive can be seen from the fact that it produces new
ways of seeing life.) This increases the distance to the subject
we already have, due to the fact that these are the words of a
fictive person, not a statement put forth by a living individual
who is making truth-claims with his or her statements. If the
latter were the case, then we would become immersed in
evaluating the claims or explaining why the claim-maker made
the claims or make fun at him or her, or what-not. In neither
case do we get any productive distance to the text, a distance
that lies in between the myopic immersion and the hyperopic
explanation.
Be that as it may, even though there are creative poetical
metaphors to be found outside the realm of imaginative
literature, they do not have this particular effect of augmenting
productive distance. And after all, is not imaginative literature
the true realm of creative poetical metaphors? Such metaphors
as organic parts of works of imaginative literature can disclose
the tacit dimension but hardly the know-how part. As far as I
know, nobody has ever learned to swim by reading poetry! We
are left with KF, "know-what," or even some hitherto unknown
type of tacit knowledge. I will try to show that literature can
be of help in articulating KF and "know-what."
5. Actions and the Tacit Knowledge of Emotions
Johannessen quite correctly says that our mastery of
emotional concepts tends to be tacit; our knowledge of
emotions is to a large extent KF. In order to show this,
Johannessen once again seeks Wittgenstein's support.
Wittgenstein was correct about there being more consensus
concerning our judgments about colors than our judgments
about emotions. To be sure, we learn to employ both types of
concepts in a similar fashion, i.e., with the aid of examples.
The difference lies in the fact that the situations where we
learn how to master emotional concepts are much more
complex and less perspicuous than situations involving most
other kinds of concepts. The situations in question are difficult
situations of human existence in which other people are
involved. In such situations, an experienced person with a
keen understanding of other people can teach the lessexperienced one by giving him or her the correct hints. The
experienced person can, for instance, ask his or her lessexperienced friend to notice the fact that a man in their
presence is shifty-eyed and his hands shake every time a
stranger is present. (Notice the importance of concrete
examples.) Now, the experienced one can point out to the
inexperienced friend that the man's body language, including
his facial expressions, can mean different things depending on
the context. If the man in question has been apprehended for

shoplifting, his body language may be interpreted as
expressing his fear of the consequences. We can also think of
a context where he reveals to us the secret of his unrequited
love for a certain woman, in which case we can guess that his
body language expresses his unhappiness. Then again, we can
think of a situation where our nervous friend is waiting for a
person he does not want us to meet. In that case, we can
interpret his body language as expressing uneasiness.
So we see that the correct use of emotional concepts is a
function of the understanding of the complex interaction
between bodily expression and facial expressions, on the one
hand, and the nature of the situation, on the other. But this
complex cannot be grasped with the aid of rules that have no
exception. Therefore, the understanding of other people can
only be acquired with the aid of correct judgements,
Wittgenstein says.[20] This means that our understanding of
other humans is determined by paradigmatic couplings of
types of situations and emotional expressions. Actually, the
person who knows the working of the human mind operates
like a judge who works within the framework of a judicial
system where the case law principle dominates. In such a
system, certain rulings of court become precedents and the
paragraphs of the law book play a lesser role. What
Wittgenstein calls judgments are analogous to the judgments
passed in courts of this type. The world of emotions is a world
where case law rules because our knowledge of emotions is
KF. Contrast this to our propositional knowledge of the
physical world; it can be grasped in propositions about iron
laws, laws that allow no exceptions.
Now, the Wittgensteinians have been accused of
overestimating the importance of behavior in our emotional
life. One of their critics, Robert Solomon, maintains that
certain emotions do not involve behavior. Among them are
guilt and resentment; it belongs to their essence that they
refrain from expression.[21] But if envy and resentment had
never been expressed in public, then every envious and
resentful person could have his or her own private concept for
envy and resentment. And what criteria would we then have of
them really being envious or resentful and not just imagining
that they are in those emotional states? Further, I might
believe that I have friendly feelings towards someone, but at
the same time my actions towards that person show that what
I mistook for feelings of friendship were actually feelings of
paternal-like warmth, i.e., I treat my friend like a child.
Chances are that actions typically give us important clues to
the nature of at least some of our emotions. Is not scrutinizing
our actions the best way to find out whether we really love a
person or are just infatuated, or even simply fond of that
individual? I might sincerely believe that I am in love with
Ann, while I systematically betray her, never caress her, and
even beat her now and then. Another person could point out to
me that my actions contradict my belief. Or I might discover
by analyzing my own actions that I am not really in love with
Ann, although I believe the contrary. I might discover that I
was only infatuated with her or that I simply wanted to
dominate her.
However, the Wittgensteinians certainly can be criticised for
not drawing a clear-cut line between non-meaningful behavior

(hands that shake) and meaningful actions. As the reader has
discovered, I deliberately refrain from using the term
'behavior' and instead use 'acting' in under to underline that I
am no behaviorist. Actions certainly play an essential role in
our emotional life, as my examples show. Whether pure, raw
behavior does, I would not know.
The upshot of this is that there are at least some important
cases where observing and analyzing actions in a given
context play an important role in understanding emotions.
Here is where my analysis of imaginative literature comes into
the picture. I maintain that literature can give us insights into
the peculiarities of the aforementioned contexts. Literature
often describes unique situations, in contrast to nomological
science, whose business is to generalise. We tend to think that
great literature provides us with unique descriptions of the
unique (!) and that the value of literature lies in, among other
things, this descriptive ability. Let us look at the following
quotation from Virginia Woolf's To the Lighthouse:
Never did anybody look so sad. Bitter and black,
half-way down, in the darkness, in the shaft from
the sunlight to the depths, perhaps a tear
formed; a tear fell; the waters swayed this way
and that, received it, and were at rest. Never did
anybody look so sad.[22]
Janet Martin Soskice has a point when she says that the
sorrow thematized in this quotation is a private, particular
sorrow, which must be illuminated with the aid of this
particular metaphor, not any old metaphor.[23] This also
illustrates the personal aspect of emotions, the fact that an
emotion is something that only a given person can have. This
is an aspect that no analysis of emotions in general may forget
but that is hard to incorporate in analysis. The particular
ability of imaginative literature to disclose the unique, not
least the uniquely personal, comes in handy here.
We find some good descriptions of Wittgensteinian contexts in
Egil's Saga, one of the great Icelandic sagas of the Middle
Ages. Its chief protagonist, the Viking and bard Egill
Skallagrímsson, was at one point in time a mercenary in the
forces of the Anglo-Saxon king Athelstan. Egill's brother was
also at the Anglo-Saxon court and got killed in a battle. The
saga contains a marvellous description of the mighty warrior's
reactions to the death of his brother. Egill sits down in front of
the Anglo-Saxon king with his head bowed. He draws the
sword in and out of the sheath – it is implied that he is
wondering whether or not to slay the king. At the same time,
he lets one eyebrow sink down right to the cheek and lifts the
other up to the roots of his hair. This masterful description of
the great poet's actions, facial expressions, and body language
is then tied to a description of his temper and looks.[24] The
interplay between these elements helps us to understand that
he expresses wrath and sorrow.
In actual fact, the saga's description increases our insight into
what it means to express feelings with the aid of actions, body
language, and the like. Such examples show us that actions
and body language are context-dependent, not least because
the writer does not force us to accept a given interpretation.
We, the readers, have to interpret Egill's actions and facial

expressions in the light of the description of the situation and
the character. Further, the saga does not provide us with any
new information about emotions; at least not with information
we could not have gotten either from experience or from nonnarrative and non-fictional sources.[25] What the saga does is
articulate our KF about certain emotions, in this case, anger
and sorrow, by giving us a concrete and unique example of
the way such emotions can be expressed, cf. the role of
examples in the articulation of KF. Moreover, it gives us an
opportunity to become conscious of the fact that there are no
formulas for our interpretation of other people's emotional
behavior. In practice, most of us do not apply any formulas in
such cases, but we almost never think about that fact until we
are confronted by a great literary work like Egil's Saga. Being
a story, not a part of our lives, gives us the necessary distance
from these issues, a distance that helps us to take a reflective
stance to them (compare Palmer's analysis). Thus,
imaginative literature awakens us from our dogmatic
slumbers.
6. The Disclosive Power of Similes and Metaphors in
Literature
Let us see how the use of similes can articulate our gentle,
cozy feeling of warmth in a snowy landscape. This is how the
Swiss writer Robert Walser does it:
Und warm ist es in all dem dichten weichen
Schnee, so warm wie in einem heimeligen
Wohnzimmer, wo friedfertige Menschen zu
irgendeinem feinen lieben Vergnügen versammelt
sind.[26]
In my rough and tough translation:
And it is warm in all this thick soft snow, as warm
as a cozy room where peaceful people are
gathered for some fine, sweet entertainment.
Walser's simile is very apt; it really fits the feeling of
tranquility we often have in such a snowy landscape but
usually lack the words to describe in an adequate fashion.
Notice that he discloses something intangible – the feeling of
tranquility in a snowy landscape – by comparing it to
something more concrete, the doings of peaceful people in
their homes.
It is common knowledge that metaphors are of even greater
importance in literature than similes. And as we remember,
Johannessen correctly assigns metaphors an important role in
the articulation of KF or at least some kinds of it. He
emphasizes that they are of utmost importance in the
articulation of our knowledge of emotions, due to the tacit
nature of that knowledge. I want to add that it is not a
coincidence that our emotional vocabulary is soaked with
metaphors, both dead and alive. Think about "being down" or
"being in high spirits," two dead metaphors. Such cognitive
semanticists as George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and Zoltán
Kövecses say that certain emotional concepts are

metaphorically structured.[27] These concepts are not clearly
delineated in our experience and must therefore be
comprehended indirectly, via metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson
use the concept of love as an example.[28] This emotion is
certainly not clearly delineated from other emotions: there are
unclear boundaries between loving someone and just being
fond of him or her. (We could add between loving a person or
being infatuated with her, cf. my earlier example.) We get a
better idea of love and other emotions by seeing them in the
light of physical phenomena, which are more clearly
delineated.[29]
This is where metaphors enter the stage because, according to
Lakoff and Johnson, "the essence of a metaphor is
understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of
another."[30] Thus, in the metaphor "Love is a journey," we
understand one kind of thing, an emotion, in terms of another
kind, a process of physically moving through space.[31]
Walser's text fits nicely into Lakoff's scheme of things, because
in that text a certain emotion is likened to something physical.
And even though Walser uses the marker "wie" (as), which
indicates a simile, Lakoff would probably call it a metaphor,
because he does not think that metaphors are primarily
linguistic. They are cognitive by nature and can be expressed
with the aid of various non-linguistic and linguistic means,
including similes.[32] Whatever the merits of this analysis,
Lakoff and his friends are on the right track when it comes to
the importance of metaphors for the understanding of
emotions.
Lakoff and his former associate Mark Turner say that poetical
metaphors develop and extend conventional metaphors.
"Death is a dream" can be a poetical extension of the
conventional metaphor "Death is sleep."[33] This is quite an
intriguing idea and can be supported by an example from the
writings of award-winning Icelandic author Einar Már
Guðmundsson n. He shows us how we can make a poetical
extension of the conventional metaphor (and oxymoron) of
"deafening silence," which indeed is a (dead?) metaphor for a
certain emotion:
The silence.
It is a blind man with a stick. It plays a drum solo
by the kitchen sink, flushes the toilet and turns
the raindrops, lashing against the windowpanes
into speakers with pulpits like humps on their
backs, continually raising their voices.
Louder, louder, louder, until they end up
sounding like a male voice choir singing partsong, so overpowering that floor cloths cover up
their ears.[34]
The author uses striking and original metaphors to articulate
our intuitive understanding of this emotion, the feeling of an
overwhelming, "loud," silence. We could say, in a Lakoffian
fashion, that the author develops an everyday metaphor
("deafening silence") by creating new metaphors on the basis
of it. Notice also that he uses concrete phenomena (the sound
of a toilet flushing, the sound of raindrops on windowpanes,
and so on) as means for throwing light upon something

abstract and intangible, i.e., the emotion in question. Further,
he uses one of literatures noblest tool, the time-honored
Verfremdung. Now, the effect of estrangement is supposed to
make us aware of things that we take for granted, and we
certainly do take our tacit knowledge for granted. This
includes, of course, our tacit knowledge of the feeling of
deafening silence. The Icelandic author's use of Verfremdung
may make us become aware of this knowledge.
Anyway, we have learned from Lakoff and his colleagues that
metaphors provide us with an indispensable and indirect
understanding of such a slippery phenomenon as love.[35]
Furthermore, Johannessen is right about our needing
metaphors because of the tacit nature of emotional
knowledge. (Notice that we often say, "I cannot express how
much I love you." Is it because our emotional knowledge is
tacit?). So it is no coincidence that literature is full of
metaphors for emotions. Think about that very gospel of love,
Romeo and Juliet. The play brims over with metaphors
concerning love: Do I have to remind my learned readership of
"Juliet is the sun"?[36]
Does not this metaphor articulate the feeling we have that the
loved one somehow shines and is at the centre of our
universe? (Notice that I use metaphors like "centre of our
universe" in my attempt to give a sketch of Shakespeare's
metaphor. It can hardly ever be fully explicated.) Does not the
great bard articulate a similar feeling in his famous "Shall I
compare thee to a summer's day? Thou art more lovely and
more temperate."[37] Both in this simile and in Romeo's
metaphor, Shakespeare gives us an opportunity to see
something intangible, the feeling of loving admiration, in terms
of something more physical, the weather of a summer's day
and the sun. With this, of course, Lakoff's analysis is in accord.
Moreover, these metaphors can help us to articulate our
emotions in the Taylorian sense of articulation. I might, for
instance, articulate my own love for a certain woman with the
aid of Shakespeare's beautiful metaphors, while at the same
time the emotion slightly changes. I might connect the
emotion (my love) to suns and summer days, so that
whenever I feel my love for the woman, I also feel the warmth
of a nice summer's day. I did not have that feeling before the
articulation, so the emotion is not exactly as it used to be. At
the same time, my understanding of the emotion has
deepened. I know now that there is a distant relationship
between the happiness I feel whenever I am with the woman
and the blissfulness I felt as a child on beautiful sunny days (I
come from a country where the sun hardly ever shines!).
My educated guess is that such poetic metaphors and similes
help us to articulate our tacit emotional knowledge. There
must be a reason why poetical metaphors for emotions are so
widely used, both in ordinary discourse and in imaginative
literature. My theory could be an explanation for this. The
theory of the productive distance, provided by literature, can
also explain why we often feel that poetical metaphors for
emotions in literary works tend to articulate emotions better
than such metaphors used in other contexts.
I have still not given any example of how a literary work can,
as a whole, be of help in our articulation of KF. Such an

example can be found in Robert Frost's poem "The Road Not
Taken." The speaker in the poem says that once he was faced
with choosing between two paths in "a yellow forest." In the
last lines of the poem he says:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and II took the one less travelled by,
And that has made all the difference.[38]
This poem is usually interpreted as being in its entirety a
metaphor for the choices we make in life. Life is
metaphorically seen as a journey, and the speaker in the
poem has chosen to live in a different fashion from ordinary
people. The poem has a bittersweet quality; it seems to
express that strange ambivalent feeling we often have when
we contemplate the existential choices we have made. We
might feel that we by and large made the correct choices, but
there is a slight sadness in us. It is like we also mourn the
moments lost by not choosing other paths. Frost helps us
clarify these feelings by presenting us with a vivid, concrete
picture of a wanderer in a wood. More precisely, he helps us
articulate our KF of these emotions, a knowledge we already
possess and which possesses us, but which we have not been
able to articulate it in words. Frost provides us with fruitful,
fresh poetical metaphors, one of the best instruments for
articulating our KF of this and other emotions. His poem is a
midwife, aiding us while we deliver and our baby is our tacit
knowledge of the emotions connected to existential choices.
7. Understanding Moods
Let us probe the realm of feelings still further. Sorrow has a
cousin called depression, and depression is a mood.[39]
Moods have been famously expressed in a host of literary
works. Let us look at August Stramm's expressionistic poem
"Depression" ("Schwermut").
SCHWERMUT
Schreiten Streben
Leben sehnt
Schauern Stehen
Blicke suchen
Sterben wächst
Das Kommen
Schreit!
Tief
Stummen
Wir.[40]
In my translation:
DEPRESSION

Striding striving.
Life yearns.
Shuddering standing.
Looks seek.
Dying grows.
The Coming
Screams!
Deep down
Dumbified
We.
Actually, this poem is barely translatable because the poet
uses the peculiarities of the German language for all it is
worth, while creating a language of his own at the same time.
Perhaps moods like depression can only be expressed in new
language ("dumbified"), far removed from everyday chitchat.
By breaking up the syntax, Stramm hints at the broken down,
chaotic inner world of the sad person. Note also the
Verfremdungseffekt, which is caused by the nominalization of
verbs. In our case, we suddenly understand that the world of
the sad one is frozen like the verbs, which are frozen into
substantives. The suggestive rhythm of the poem is also of
utmost importance. One can almost hear the fast heartbeat of
the unhappy one and the rhythmic march of his dark thoughts
through his brain. "The world of the happy is quite another
than the world of the unhappy," Wittgenstein says.[41]
Stramm's poem is a message from the unhappy world to the
world of the blissful.
But poetic words about messages and unhappy worlds cannot
help us to understand the cognitive import of Stramm's poem.
That help can be found in the theories of Palmer. Thanks to
our and Stramm's ability to see the world through the eyes of
a depressed person, Stramm could write the poem and we
were able to understand it; compare Palmer's analysis of
Hamlet. Remember, also, Palmer's contention that such
literary devices as rhythm can help a writer to show states of
mind. This is exactly what Stramm does with the gloomy
rhythm of his poem. Actually, we can safely say that the poem
gives us "know-what" about depression. It shows rather than
tells us about this mood, which is one of the reasons why it
aids us in articulating tacit knowledge of it (the mood). The
main means the poet uses is our old friend the Verfremdung.
As we have seen, there are ways in which this effect can help
us articulate our KF of emotions. This fact ought to strengthen
our belief that KF and "know-what" have a thing or two in
common.
Literary works can help articulate our KF and "know-what" of
emotions. We use its devices for attaining these goals; among
the devices are such stylistic devices as estrangement. I think
that the other examples I have used are also examples of
articulations of "know-what" about emotions. We get a better
grip on what the feeling of warmth and coziness is by reading

Walser, and the Icelandic writer helps us to understand what
deafening silence is. At the same time these literary works
articulate our knowledge by familiarity of the emotions and
moods in question. Stramm's poem does that too, because it
helps us articulate knowledge of a mood most of us have felt
without being able to say much about. Further, they (at least
Stramm's poem) aid us in Taylorian articulations. Stramm's
Schwermut might, for instance, help me to articulate my
current depression in such a way that I start to see it as
having moments of angst; after all, the poem is brimming with
anxiety ("Das Kommen schreit!"). In light of this, I understand
my depression differently at the same time,/ as it somehow
changes; my depressive feelings get a distinct flavor of
anxiety. Maybe the depression, after all, was caused by
repressed angst. The poem has been my midwife, helping me
to deliver these monstrous Siamese twins, depression and
angst.
8. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we discovered that the kind of insight we get
thanks to the disclosive power of literature is akin to KF,
"knowing what," and the results of articulations. Disclosing
means showing rather than saying, just like when Einar Már
Guðmundsson shows what deafing silence is. Disclosing means
grasping something intuitively and holistically, just like when
Stramm provides us with a total vision of depression, a vision
that helps us to intuitively understand depression, in stark
contrast to the scientific, analytic understanding of it.
Disclosing is also somewhat like seeing something in
something else, like when we see faces in clouds. Frost's poem
helps us see a meaningful unit – a narrative of a journey – in
the chaotic series of events in our lives. The poem is a
narrative about some painful choices of direction. Further,
disclosing is like seeing something as something else, as, for
instance, when a poetic metaphor shows a beloved woman as
the sun.
I will use the remainder of this paper to consider a couple of
possible objections to my analysis, as well as to sum up my
argument. The former of these two objections is as follows:
The author does not understand that we do not need a literary
work for such an articulation. We can use apt metaphors and
concrete examples in everyday life or imaginative theoretical
discourses. Furthermore, meaningful gestures (one of the
means of articulation) certainly have no role to play in
literature, except perhaps in plays.
Well, I quite agree, but I want to add that I have never said
that literary works monopolize the articulation. As I said
earlier, the devices can be tools of such an articulation, but
this does not mean that they have to be a part of a literary
work in order to perform that task. This means that, for
instance, a philosophical or religious text containing a lot of
poetical metaphors can be an instrument of articulation. But
texts of imaginative literature tend to be even better tools for
that endeavour, the reason being that imaginative literature
gives us a productive distance to our feelings. The same does
not hold true for religious and philosophical texts, unless they
are read as literary works. If we do not read them as literary
works but as texts with straight forward truth-claims, then we

either believe or disbelieve the claims or analyze them
otherwise and thus immerse us in them, or we seek causal
explanations for them and thereby move faraway from the
text. (Compare what I said earlier about persons using
poetical metaphors in everyday settings.) In neither case do
we get any productive distance from content of text. The
productive distance can only be gotten by reading the text qua
a work of literary imagination.
The latter possible criticism is the following: The author does
not see that interpretations of literary works are more or less
subjective. Therefore his interpretations might be inspiring for
him, but the texts could be interpreted in quite a different
manner. My answer is that I just want to bracket this problem
and take my chances that my interpretations are somehow
acceptable – adequate and/or fruitful, not absurd, even true.
The same applies to my analysis in general; I know I am
treading on slippery ground when I maintain that literature
can give insights into tacit knowledge. It is hard to see how
such a theory can be proven with absolute certainty; what
philosophical theory can?
But bear in mind that we cannot be 100% sure that physics is
not a sham. Nevertheless, we have good reasons to think that
this not the case. I simply hope that I have put forth
reasonable arguments in favor of literature having the power
of articulating tacit knowledge, arguments that might provide
an inspiration for other scholars.
We have seen in this paper that our knowledge of emotions
tends to be tacit. But this knowledge is not entirely ineffable,
and literature can play a major role in articulating it.
Imaginative literature does not have to provide us with new
information. What it does best is to give us insight into (tacit)
knowledge we already possess. Thus, the poet is a midwife,
helping us to deliver, soothing us in our birth pangs.
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